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ABSTRACT
The year 2011 proved to be a momentous year in patent law. The doctrine of inequitable conduct
was particularly rocked by changes to the law. Both the Federal Circuit’s decision in Therasense,
Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson and Co. and the America Invents Act effectively gutted the inequitable
conduct cause of action. Therasense tightened the materiality and intent standards, thus lowering
the duty of candor standard that will be enforced in the courts. The America Invents Act created an
escape clause for those who fail to disclose adequately during initial examination through the
supplemental examination process. Did Congress and the Federal Circuit overreact to the “plague”
of inequitable conduct allegations? This article explores the unintended consequences that may
follow from their actions.
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“THERE’S A HOLE IN THE BUCKET:” THE EFFECTIVE ELIMINATION OF THE
INEQUITABLE CONDUCT DOCTRINE
KATHERINE E. WHITE*
INTRODUCTION
In 2011, the combination of both Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co.1
and the enactment of the America Invents Act (“AIA”)2 effectively eliminated the
judicial doctrine of inequitable conduct in patent cases. In order to obtain a patent,
applicants have long had a duty of candor before the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office (“PTO”).3 Inventors are often the most knowledgeable about why their
invention is new and nonobvious over the prior art, which are essential requirements
for patentability.4 Candid correspondence with the PTO is essential to preserving
integrity in the ex parte patenting process, where no other party participates to
induce full disclosure.5 The doctrine of inequitable conduct, historically, has been the
key gatekeeper policing the patent system’s integrity.6 Now, with its virtual
elimination, is there still sufficient incentive to comply with the “duty of candor”7
principles that have traditionally served the patenting process? It is without
question, the use of inequitable conduct to police the duty of candor has been abused
over the years.8 But, perhaps this cure is worse than the disease. In making these
changes, there was little discourse about the value of the inequitable conduct
doctrine and its role in preserving the integrity of the patenting process. Instead, the
focus was primarily on lessening the doctrine’s bite.

* © Katherine E. White 2012 .Professor White has a B.S.E. in Electrical Engineering and
Computer Science from Princeton University, a J.D. from the University of Washington, and an
LL.M. from the George Washington University Law School. From 1995–1996, she served as a
judicial law clerk to the Honorable Randall R. Rader, Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit. She is currently a Professor of Law at the Wayne State University Law School in
Detroit. She also serves as a Lt. Colonel in the U.S. Army reserves currently serving as an
Instructor of Law at the United States Military Academy at West Point, NY. Appointed by the
Secretary of Agriculture, she serves on the U.S. Department of Agriculture Plant Variety Protection
Board (2004-2008, 2010-Present). In addition, she is a statewide elected member of the University
of Michigan Board of Regents (1999-Present), a Fulbright Senior Scholar (1999-2000 Max Planck
Institute, Munich, Germany), a White House Fellow (2001–2002), a former member of the United
States Patent and Trademark Office Patent Public Advisory Committee (2000-2002); and a
registered patent attorney.
1 Therasense Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
2 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) [hereinafter AIA].
3 See 24 Fed. Reg. 10322, 10336–37 (Dec. 22, 1959) (codified at 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2011)).
4 See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006) (setting forth what is considered prior art).
5 See Norton v. Curtiss, 433 F.2d 779, 793–94 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (recognizing the necessary
relationship of trust between applicants and the Patent Office requires expanding the types of
misconduct courts must police).
6 Id.
7 See 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2011).
8 See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
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Therasense tightened the materiality and intent standards, thus lowering the
duty of candor standard that will be enforced in the courts.9 At the same time, the
AIA has instituted an escape clause for those who fail to disclose adequately during
initial examination. Such applicants are now allowed to correct any deceptive
conduct through the new supplemental examination process.10 Now, a patentee who
was not originally candid with the PTO during initial examination may ask the PTO
to “consider, reconsider, or correct information believed to be relevant to the
patent.”11 This process has been coined a “patent amnesty program”12 because it
tolerates all but the most egregious forms of fraud on the PTO.13 The question is
whether such a profound change in policing the duty of candor will threaten the
integrity of the patent system. The unintended consequences of these changes are
yet to be known. Inequitable conduct was the traditional way to plug the hole in the
proverbial bucket. But now, after these changes, whenever there is a hole in the
bucket that needs plugging, the tools required to plug the hole need a bucket without
one.
I. BACKGROUND
The Patent Clause explicitly grants Congress plenary power to write laws to
“promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times
to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right to their . . . Discoveries.”14 In fulfilling its duty,
Congress, since the country’s founding, has passed laws to encourage inventors to
disclose their inventions publicly.15 For the social contract to work, inventors are
granted an exclusive monopoly over their inventions for a period of years16 in
exchange for disclosing their inventions to the public. Publicly sharing innovation
and ingenuity permits other skilled artisans to build on prior knowledge and advance
their own unique ideas.17 Accordingly, disclosing patentable inventions, which are
new and nonobvious advancements over what has come before,18 benefits society and
future inventors.19
To evaluate whether an invention is new and nonobvious over the prior art, the
PTO must be aware of and evaluate the teachings of all information material to
See Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1290.
See AIA, supra note 2, § 12; see also 35 U.S.C. § 257 (2006).
11 Id.
12 Jason Rantanen & Lee Petherbridge, Toward a System of Invention Registration:
The
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 110 MICH. L. REV. 24, 25 (2011).
13 Id.
14 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
15 See Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109.
16 35 U.S.C. § 154 (a) (“[the patent] grant shall be a term beginning on the date the patent
issues and ending 20 years from the date on which the application for patent was filed in the United
States.”).
17 See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1580
(2003).
18 35 U.S.C. §§ 102–103 (authorizing new and nonobvious advances over the prior art to be
patentable).
19 America Invents Act, H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 38 (2011) [hereinafter AIA Report].
9

10
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patentability. The inventor (or patent applicant)20 generally has the best information
available to assist the patent examiner.21 As a consequence, to encourage the
inventor to disclose what is known, the inventor, under section 1.56 of chapter 37 of
the Code of Federal Regulations (“CFR”),22 has a “duty of candor and good faith” in
dealing with the PTO.23 In other words, the inventor is required to disclose any
known prior art to help the PTO establish whether the invention is patentable.24
Traditionally, patents obtained in bad faith, or through intentional
misrepresentations or omissions are invalid or unenforceable.25 This legal concept
has evolved into the judicial doctrine of inequitable conduct allowing challenges to
patent enforceability for material misrepresentations or omissions made before the
PTO.26 The remedy for an inequitable conduct finding makes a patent entirely and
utterly unenforceable.27
In addition, inequitable conduct charges damage a patent attorney’s reputation
as a bad actor, discouraging settlement, and averting attention away from the
alleged infringement.28 Tarnishing one patent with inequitable conduct could also
spread to other related applications and patents, making them also unenforceable.29
Promoting candor before the PTO is a worthy goal because it assists patent
examiners in performing their duties more effectively.30 But, because the remedy for
inequitable conduct is so extreme, “the habit of charging inequitable conduct in
almost every major patent case [despite it being difficult to prove subjective intent to

20 See 35 U.S.C. § 118 (allowing non-inventors to apply for patent applications where the
inventor has assigned or is obligated to assign the invention).
21 See 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2011); see also Norton, 433 F.2d at 794 (“[The PTO] must rely on
applicants for many of the facts upon which its decisions are based.”).
22 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a).
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Precision Instrument Mfg. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 819 (1945); Hazel-Atlas
Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 250 (1944); Keystone Driller Co. v. Gen. Excavator
Co., 290 U.S. 240, 244–45 (1933); Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867,
877 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Norton, 433 F.2d at 793.
26 Kingsdown, 863 F.2d at 877; J.P. Stevens & Co., Inc. v. Lex Tex Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553, 1559
(Fed. Cir. 1984) (“Conduct before the PTO that may render a patent unenforceable is broader than
‘common law fraud.’”); Norton, 433 F.2d at 793 (“[T]he concept of ‘fraud’ on the Patent
Office . . . encompasses . . . a wider range of ‘inequitable’ conduct found to justify holding a patent
unenforceable.”); See also 35 U.S.C. § 282 (allowing patent unenforceability challenges generally).
27 See Kingsdown, 863 F.2d at 877; J.P. Stevens, 747 F.2d at 1559.
28 See Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1289.
29 Id. at 1288 (“[T]he taint of a finding of inequitable conduct can spread from a single patent to
render unenforceable other related patents and applications in the same technology family.”); see
also Cordis Corp. v. Boston Scientific Corp., 658 F.3d 1347, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (regarding the
enforceability of two patents as “inextricably linked, with the enforceability of [one] patent a
predicate issue necessary to our determination of the enforceability of the [other] patent”); The Duty
of Candor Under Rule 56 and the Evolution of Proposed Rule 57: The Doctrine of Inequitable
Conduct and The Duty of Candor in Patent Procurement: Its Current Adverse Impact on the
Operation of the United States Patent System, 16 AIPLA Q.J. 74, 76 (1988) [hereinafter AIPLA
Committee Paper] (“Fraudulent procurement could even render claims in related patents
unenforceable.”).
30 See Norton, 433 F.2d at 794.
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deceive] has become an absolute plague.”31 Such overkill in charging inequitable
conduct, and its extreme remedy, make valuing a patent portfolio difficult and
unpredictable. Plus, in an effort to avoid an inequitable conduct charge, patent
applicants often submit marginally pertinent references to the PTO and fail to
explain their relevance, as it may not be apparent.32
To prove inequitable conduct, an alleged infringer must show, by clear and
convincing evidence, “the patentee acted with the specific intent to deceive the
PTO . . . [including] a deliberate decision to withhold a known material reference.”33
Before recent changes were made to the inequitable conduct doctrine, its remedy
rendered a patent utterly unenforceable as to every patent claim, regardless of
whether or not such claim was otherwise a valid, new and nonobvious improvement
over the prior art.34 Because of this, the remedy for inequitable conduct has been
referred to as the “atomic bomb” of patent law.35
With all of these aforementioned problems having existed for decades, it is no
wonder both the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“Federal Circuit”) and
Congress, virtually simultaneously, stepped in to rein in the standards for finding
inequitable conduct as a defense to patent infringement. In Therasense,36 the
Federal Circuit “tighten[ed] the standards for finding intent and materiality in order
to redirect a doctrine that has been overused to the detriment of the public.”37 In
enacting the AIA in September 2011, Congress, for the first time, provides a way to
purge or correct a misrepresentation or a failure to disclose material information in a
supplemental examination process after the patent has issued.38 This process has
been coined a “patent amnesty program.”39 Although these changes did fulfill the
goal of tempering the use of an “atomic bomb”40 remedy available in inequitable
conduct charges, governments do not normally grant amnesty in these situations. In
amnesty programs, governments generally seek only to forgive past behavior because

31 Burlington, 849 F.2d at 1422; see also McKesson Info. Solutions, Inc. v. Bridge Medical, Inc.,
487 F.3d 897, 926–27 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Newman, J., dissenting) (“This court returns to the ‘plague’ of
encouraging unwarranted charges of inequitable conduct, spawning the opportunistic litigation that
here succeeded despite consistently contrary precedent.”).
32 Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1289.
33 Id. at 1290.
34 See AIA Report, supra note 19, at 28–29; see Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1288.
35 Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1288.
36 Id. at 1276.
37 Id. at 1290.
38 35 U.S.C. § 257; AIA Report, supra note 19, at 50.
The Act addresses the inequitable conduct doctrine by authorizing supplemental
examination of a patent to correct errors or omissions in proceedings before the
Office. Under this new procedure, information that was not considered or was
inadequately considered or was incorrect can be presented to the Office. If the
Office determines that the information does not present a substantial new
question of patentability or that the patent is still valid, that information cannot
later be used to hold the patent unenforceable or invalid on the basis for an
inequitable-conduct attack in civil litigation.
Id.
39 See Rantanen & Petherbridge, supra note 12, at 24.
40 See Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1288.
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it is not tenable to police while seeking to protect the future.41 The forgiveness is
what heals the past and reconciles it with moving forward peacefully.42 There is
generally a cut-off date,43 and not blanket immunity for all time, for everyone going
forward, which is what is available during supplemental examination. Instead of
keeping the doctrine of inequitable conduct intact, and merely transforming the
remedy and its disproportional result of forfeiting all patent rights in all cases, the
combination of both Therasense and the AIA have effectively eliminated inequitable
conduct as a defense in all but the most egregious and fraudulent situations. The
doctrine of inequitable conduct was gutted by Therasense and then pierced through
its core by the AIA.
In the debates surrounding the problems with inequitable conduct, lacking were
affirmative discussions regarding the type of misconduct that should be policed in an
inequitable conduct charge.44 Instead the focus was on ending the apparent litigation
abuses by charging inequitable conduct in almost every case.45 In other words,
instead of discourse on the value of the inequitable conduct doctrine and how it
should be better implemented, the rhetoric fixated on stopping the doctrine because
it was out of control.46 With unenforceability as inequitable conduct’s remedy, the
call for predictability in patent valuation won the day and drastic changes were made
to cripple the doctrine by both the courts and Congress.47 Unfortunately, the changes
weakened the doctrine so much it has lost all of its teeth. Such a drastic outcome
may have serious unintended consequences that will probably need to be addressed
either through case law or through regulation. It is unlikely, however, Congress will
take up amending the patent laws within the decade.
This paper seeks to encourage the patent bar to have an affirmative debate
about what type of misconduct or intent to deceive should continue to be policed and
may now fall through the cracks and evade enforcement. In the past, courts have
observed what type of disclosure is essential.48 This paper serves to motivate future

41 See AMNESTY COMMITTEE, Legal Basis of the Amnesty Process, in VOL. 6 TRUTH AND
RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA 1, 4 (2003).
42 Id. at 90.
43 Id.
44 See Thomas F. Cotter, An Economic Analysis of Patent Law’s Inequitable Conduct Doctrine,
53 ARIZ. L. REV. 736, 740 (2011).
45 AIA Report, supra note 19, at 50.
Critics of the inequitable conduct defense, including the National Academies and
the Federal Trade Commission, argue that our patent system is hampered by
provisions that require courts to divine the difficult-to-prove subjective intent of
individuals in patent disputes. And most defendants reflexively plead inequitable
conduct as a defense to infringement, prompting the Federal Circuit to label the
practice a ‘plague’ on the patent system.
Id.
46 See id.
47 Id.
48 Larson Mfg. Co. of South Dakota v. Aluminart Prods. Ltd, 559 F.3d 1317, 1327 (Fed. Cir.
2009) (“[I]nequitable conduct requires not intent to withhold, but rather intent to deceive.”); M.
Eagles Tool Warehouse, Inc. v. Fisher Tooling Co., 439 F.3d 1335, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“Intent to
deceive cannot be inferred solely from the fact that information was not disclosed; there must be a
factual basis for a finding of deceptive intent.”); LaBounty Mfg., Inc. v. U.S. Int’l. Trade Comm’n,
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discussions that should have been part of the Patent Reform movement as it relates
to the doctrine of inequitable conduct. Part II presents some of the dialogue and case
law advocating restraining the inequitable conduct doctrine. Part III addresses what
the combination of Therasense and the AIA have done to limit the application of the
doctrine of inequitable conduct and other unintended consequences. Part IV reviews
cases using the new inequitable conduct standard under Therasense after previously
having used the prior standard. Finally, Part V concludes.
II. REASONS ARGUED FOR RESTRAINING THE INEQUITABLE CONDUCT DOCTRINE
The aforementioned criticism of how inequitable conduct is implemented is not
new. The standard for the duty of candor before the PTO has been denounced as out
of control for decades. In 1988, the American Intellectual Property Law Association
(“AIPLA”) wrote a report detailing how inequitable conduct findings adversely
affected the United States patent system.49 In a white paper, the Committee said the
courts’ implementation of the duty to disclose before the PTO had the effect of
denying “patent protection for some worthy inventions and to generate uncertainty
and confusion as to the enforceability of many patents.”50 At that time, mere gross
negligence in failing to disclose material information to the PTO was grounds for an
inequitable conduct finding.51
Further complicating matters, an inequitable conduct charge centers on the
“moral turpitude of the inventor and the patent owner and the professional integrity
of the patent attorney or agent.”52 This “makes settlement more difficult and tends
to deflect attention away from the basic merits of whether the invention . . . is
patentable . . . and . . . is being infringed.”53 In its paper, the Committee made
suggestions to eliminate four undesirable aspects of the duty of candor standard
before the PTO:
1. An ambiguous and inappropriate standard of materiality.
2. Disproportionality between the nature of the alleged inequitable
conduct and the forfeiture of all patent rights.
3. An absence of clear opportunities to correct or “purge” prior
inequitable conduct that may have occurred in the procurement
of a patent.

958 F.2d 1066, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“Close cases should be resolved by disclosure, not unilaterally
by the applicant.”).
49 AIPLA Committee Paper, supra note 29, at 74–75.
50 Id. at 75.
51 Id. at 74; see also Kansas Jack, Inc. v. Kuhn, 719 F.2d 1144, 1151 (Fed. Cir. 1983)
(“Statements made with gross negligence as to their truth may establish intent [to prove fraud].”).
52 See AIPLA Committee Paper, supra note 29, at 75.
53 Id.
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4. Undue emphasis on the timing of a patent applicant’s disclosure
of material information.54
In 1988, the Federal Circuit began an attempt to fix the aforementioned
problems by restoring the intent standard required to prove inequitable conduct.55 In
Kingsdown Medical Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc.,56 the applicant was involved
in a complicated patent prosecution with a continuation application and numerous
claims. The applicant submitted a claim list to simplify which claims already were
allowed and corresponded to the claims in the continuation application.57 But, the
applicant incorrectly listed claim 43 as corresponding to allowed claim 50 in the
parent application.58 Instead, claim 43 actually corresponded to the unamended
claim 50, which was rejected for indefiniteness under section 112.59 The text of the
unamended claim, however, was included in the patent unchanged.60
The trial court found the applicant’s misrepresentation material, as it should
have been allowed only after being amended.61 Furthermore, the trial court found
the intent prong was met because the plaintiff’s “patent attorney was grossly
negligent in not catching the misrepresentation because a mere ministerial
review . . . would have uncovered the error.”62 Because the amended version of the
claim might have given the defendant a possible defense to infringement, the court
inferred motive to deceive the PTO.63 The trial court found the plaintiff’s patent
attorney reviewed the allegedly infringing device before he amended claim 50 and
before the continuation application was filed.64 The dispute arose as to whether the
trial court’s finding of intent to deceive the PTO was clearly erroneous.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit held it was improper for the trial court to infer
intent to deceive “based on what it perceived to be [patentee’s] gross negligence.”65
The Federal Circuit, savvy to the realities of patent practice, noted this case was
merely one of copying the wrong claim during a ministerial act of transferring and
renumbering allowed claims into the continuation.66 In any case, both claims
contained allowable subject matter, the rejection of the unamended claim was not
anticipated or obvious and thus “took nothing from the public domain.”67 To clarify
conflicting precedent, the Federal Circuit held gross negligence, alone, does not infer
an intent to deceive.68 To make a determination on whether the intent prong is met,
54
55

1988).

Id.
See Kingsdown Medical Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 872 (Fed. Cir.

Id. at 867.
Id. at 871.
58 Id. at 870.
59 Id. at 871.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 872.
65 Id. at 873.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 876.
56
57
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the conduct “viewed in light of all the evidence, including evidence indicative of good
faith, must indicate sufficient culpability to require a finding of intent to deceive.”69
The court tried to raise the intent standard to rein in persistent and meritless
charges of inequitable conduct. Nevertheless, the higher intent standard in
Kingsdown did not “reduce the number of inequitable conduct cases before the courts
and did not cure the problem of over-disclosure of marginally relevant prior art to the
PTO.”70 Instead, courts began using the materiality standard as a way to expand the
reach of the inequitable conduct doctrine.71 This led to the sliding scale test to
determine whether inequitable conduct has occurred, where “balancing the levels of
materiality and intent [was used] ‘with a greater showing of one factor allowing a
lesser showing of the other.’”72 The sliding scale test began to be misapplied when
courts found inequitable conduct without first finding clear and convincing evidence
of both materiality and intent to deceive. The courts abused this standard going so
far as to oft find inequitable conduct by summary judgment or to find it where
absolutely no intent to deceive was found.73 In other words, materiality had
swallowed up the intent analysis.74 But, materiality is really only relevant in direct
relation as to how it informs intent, which is hard to prove.
To further complicate matters, the courts applied different versions of Rule 56 to
determine materiality.75 As the sliding scale focused more on materiality than
intent, five standards of materiality began to emerge:76

Id.
Therasense Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
71 See id. (“In the past, this court has tried to address the proliferation of inequitable conduct
charges by raising the intent standard alone.”).
72 Digital Control, Inc. v. Charles Mach. Works, 437 F.3d 1309, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
73 See M. Eagles Tool Warehouse, Inc. v. Fisher Tooling Co., Inc., 439 F.3d 1335, 1343 (Fed.
Cir. 2006) (rejecting the trial court’s grant of summary judgment for inequitable conduct where
absolutely no findings of intent to deceive were made).
74 Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 525 F.3d 1334, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(“More recently, however, the judicial process has too often emphasized materiality almost to the
exclusion of any analysis of the lofty intent requirement for inequitable conduct.”).
75 See Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1294 (stating Rule 56 has gone through several revisions from
the 1949 standard, the 1977 standard, and the 1992 standard). The 1949 standard for Patent Office
Rule 56, for improper applications, provides in pertinent part:
Any application signed or sworn to in blank, or without actual inspection by the
applicant . . . and also any application fraudulently filed or in connection with
which any fraud is practiced or attempted on the Patent Office, may be stricken
from the files.
Id. The 1977 standard for section 1.56, for the duty of disclosure; fraud; striking or rejection of
applications, provides in pertinent part:
A duty of candor and good faith toward the Patent and Trademark Office rests on
the inventor, on each attorney or agent who prepares or prosecutes the
application and on every other individual who is substantively involved in the
preparation or prosecution of the application and who is associated with the
inventor, with the assignee or with anyone to whom there is an obligation to
assign the application. All such individuals have a duty to disclose to the Office
information they are aware of which is material to the examination of the
application. Such information is material where there is a substantial likelihood a
reasonable examiner would consider it important in deciding whether to allow the
69
70

[11:716 2012]

“There’s a Hole in the Bucket:” The Effective
Elimination of the Inequitable Conduct Doctrine

725

1. Objective but for standard: “misrepresentation was so material the
patent should not have issued,”77
2. Subjective but for standard: “misrepresentation actually caused the
examiner to approve the patent application when he would not have
otherwise done so,”78
3. But it may have standard: “where the misrepresentation may have
influenced the pa[t]ent examiner in the course of prosecution,”79
4. 1977 Rule 56 standard: duty to disclose material information, which is
defined as “where there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable
examiner would consider it important in deciding whether to allow the
application to issue as a patent;”80 and
5. 1992 Rule 56 standard: including as material any information if it
“refutes or is inconsistent with” any position the applicant took
regarding patentability.81
In 2011, both the courts and Congress intervened to tackle the inequitable
conduct debacle. But, these actions created a perfect storm, attacking the doctrine
from both ends and causing its virtual destruction.
III. HOW THERASENSE AND THE AIA HAVE VIRTUALLY ELIMINATED THE DOCTRINE OF
INEQUITABLE CONDUCT AND OTHER UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES
A. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson and Co.
In Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson and Co.,82 Chief Judge Rader, writing
for the court, best described the ills inequitable conduct has thrust upon the patent
bar:

application to issue as a patent. The duty is commensurate with the degree of
involvement in the preparation or prosecution of the application.
Id. (emphasis added). It should be noted that in Therasense, the Federal Circuit specifically declines
to adopt the current version of Rule 56 “because reliance on this standard has resulted in the very
problems this court [seeks] to address.” Id. at 1294.
76 Digital Control, 437 F.3d at 1313–16.
77 Id. at 1315.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1294 (citing 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (1992)).
82 Id. at 1276.
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While honesty at the PTO is essential, low standards for intent and
materiality have inadvertently led to many unintended consequences,
among them, increased adjudication cost and complexity, reduced likelihood
of settlement, burdened courts, strained PTO resources, increased PTO
backlog, and impaired patent quality.83
In response to these aforementioned problems, an en banc Federal Circuit,
tightened “the standards for finding both intent and materiality.”84 Although no new
intent standards were added, the court reinforced principles articulated in earlier
cases requiring deliberate action and knowledge of the materiality of an undisclosed
reference:85
1. To prove a claim of inequitable conduct, the accuser must show
“the infringer acted with specific intent to deceive the PTO.”86
2. A finding that a “misrepresentation or omission amounts to gross
negligence or negligence under a ‘should have known standard’
does not satisfy this intent requirement.”87
3. A “deliberate decision to withhold a known material reference” is
required. In other words, it must be proven applicant knew of
the reference, knew it was material, and made a deliberate
decision to withhold it.88
The court emphasized that the intent and materiality standards are separate
and independent requirements.89 Consequently, the court rejected the sliding scale
analysis, “where a weak showing of intent may be found sufficient based on a strong
showing of materiality, and vice versa.”90 However, the court did allow a trial court
to infer intent to deceive from indirect evidence, as direct evidence of deceptive intent
is uncommon.91 But the court clarified, “to meet the clear and convincing evidence
standard, the specific intent to deceive must be, in light of the totality of the
circumstances, ‘the single most reasonable inference able to be drawn from the

Id. at 1290.
Id.
85 Id.
86 Id. See also Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 575 F.3d 1312, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(“[A] pleading of inequitable conduct under Rule 9(b) must include sufficient allegations . . . from
which a court may reasonably infer . . . a specific intent to deceive . . . ”).
87 Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1290.
88 Id. (emphasis added).
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id.
83
84
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evidence.’”92 The court emphasized that where “multiple inferences may be drawn,
intent to deceive cannot be found.”93
As was discussed in Part II, the court has tried, without success, to stem the tide
of unwarranted inequitable conduct charges by raising the intent standard alone.94
Because that strategy has failed, the court took the most logical step and made a
significant change to the materiality standard in Therasense. Taking a monumental
leap, the court held the required materiality standard for establishing inequitable
conduct is but-for materiality.95 Undisclosed prior art is “but-for material if the PTO
would not have allowed a claim had it been aware of the undisclosed prior art.”96 In
evaluating but-for materiality, the court applies the same standard the PTO would to
determine whether the claim would have been allowed if the reference had been
disclosed.97 In other words, the court is to “apply the preponderance of the evidence
standard and give claims their broadest reasonable construction.”98 If there is a
corresponding invalidity finding for a claim, the higher clear and convincing burden
of persuasion required by the district court ensures that the undisclosed reference is
material.99 Even if the claim is not invalidated, the court may determine the
undisclosed reference is material if it would have prevented the PTO from issuing the
claim.100
In Therasense, the court posits that adding the but-for requirement will add
some proportionality to the remedy for inequitable conduct.101 So, instead of any
minor misconduct creating unenforceability for the entire patent, this would only
occur where a claim is unwarranted.102 Concerned, however, the but-for materiality
requirement may not effectively incorporate the conduct the Supreme Court
maligned in the unclean hands cases from which the doctrine of inequitable conduct
sprung, the court also creates an exception to the but-for requirement in cases of
affirmative egregious misconduct.103
Before the modern inequitable conduct doctrine was coined, the courts initially
policed fraudulent behavior before the PTO and the courts using the equitable
Id.
Id. at 1290–91 (“Whenever evidence proffered to show either materiality or intent is
susceptible of multiple reasonable inferences, a district court clearly errs in overlooking one
inference in favor of another equally reasonable inference.”).
94 Id. at 1291 (requiring an intent to deceive beyond gross negligence).
95 Id. See AIPLA Committee Paper, supra note 29, at 79–81. In that report, the Committee
argued it was a mistake to apply the materiality standard found in proxy statement disclosures to
inequitable conduct cases. In its view, disclosing information to shareholders was not analogous to
submitting patent applications to a skilled government officer like a patent examiner. See TSC
Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 444–49 (1976) (holding a material fact is one “a
reasonable shareholder would consider . . . important in deciding how to vote”, without having a
decisive effect on voting).
96 Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1291.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 1291–92.
99 Id. at 1292.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 1292 (“[I]t is inequitable to strike down an entire patent where the patentee
committed only minor missteps or acted with minimal culpability.”).
103 Id. (“there is no room to argue that submission of false affidavits is not material.”).
92
93
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doctrine of unclean hands.104 There were three important Supreme Court unclean
hands cases where the patentee had deliberately and carefully planned to deceive not
only the PTO, but also the courts.105 In Keystone Driller Co. v. Gen. Excavator Co.,106
the patentee bribed a prior inventor to say he abandoned the invention when he had
not.107 The patentee conspired with the prior inventor to suppress evidence of prior
use to lessen the chance the patent would be invalidated.108 In Hazel-Atlas Glass Co.
v. Hartford-Empire,109 to overcome prior art rejections in the PTO, patentee paid an
alleged disinterested well-known expert to lie about writing an article touting the
advantages of the invention over the prior art, when in fact, patentee’s lawyers wrote
the article.110 After submitting this article to the PTO, the patent was granted.111
Patentee later sued Hazel-Atlas for patent infringement.112 At trial, the patent was
found not infringed.113 On appeal, patentee drew attention to the ill-gotten article
and the court overturned the trial court, finding infringement.114 In Precision
Instrument Mfg. v. Automotive Maintenance Machinery,115 the patentee failed to
disclose fraudulent testimony, before both the PTO and in court, regarding inventor’s
alleged dates of “conception, disclosure, drawings, description and reduction to
practice . . . ”116 Instead of disclosing the perjury, patentee entered into a settlement
agreement with the prior inventor and suppressed the evidence of perjury.117 Then,
patentee enforced its patent against alleged infringers, knowing it was ill-gotten.118
In these aforementioned seminal unclean hands cases, the remedy in each
differed from the modern version of inequitable conduct. Instead of rendering the
entire patented invention unenforceable,119 the Court denied relief for any claimed
infringement of the patent procured in the pertinent action.120 In other words, the

Id.
See Precision Instrument Mfg. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 806 (1945); HazelAtlas Glass v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 238 (1944); Keystone Driller Co. v. General
Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240 (1933).
106 Keystone, 290 U.S. at 240.
107 Id. at 243.
108 Id.
109 Hazel-Atlas Glass, 322 U.S. at 238.
110 Id. at 240–42.
111 Id.at 240–41.
112 Id. at 241.
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 Precision Instrument Mfg. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 806 (1945).
116 Id. at 809–10.
117 Id. at 812–14.
118 Id. at 814.
119 Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 877 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
(“When a court has finally determined that inequitable conduct has occurred . . . the entire patent is
rendered unenforceable.”).
120 See, e.g., Precision Instrument, 324 U.S. at 819 (“Such inequitable conduct impregnated
[plaintiff’s] entire cause of action and justified dismissal by resort to the unclean hands doctrine.”);
Hazel-Atlas Glass v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 250 (1944) (“The total effect of all this
fraud . . . calls for nothing less than a complete denial of relief . . . for the claimed
infringement . . . ”); Keystone Driller Co. v. General Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 247 (1933) (holding
plaintiffs did not come into court with clean hands).
104
105
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patent claims were found unenforceable in the present action, but not found to be
entirely unenforceable against all future actions against any party.
Although the court in Therasense does not define affirmative egregious
misconduct, the court makes clear “the exception to the general rule requiring but-for
proof . . . [includes the] ‘deliberately planned and carefully executed scheme[s]’ to
defraud the PTO and the courts.”121 Another example falling within the exception is
the “filing of an unmistakably false affidavit.”122 Such misconduct is regarded as
material.123
Therasense, however, did not address all of the concerns complained about
regarding inequitable conduct. But, where Therasense left off, the AIA took over.
One of the most groundbreaking changes the AIA added to U.S. patent law is the
supplemental examination process in section 257, which will be effective September
16, 2012.124 This new process “authoriz[es] supplemental examination of a patent to
correct errors or omissions in proceedings before the [PTO].”125 Thus, any omission
or misrepresentation that was not previously considered, was inadequate, or was
incorrect can be put forth in the PTO, allowing misconduct to be purged after the
patent has issued.126 A patent owner may request supplemental examination of its
patent “to consider, reconsider, or correct information believed to be relevant to the
patent.”127 In effect, this is a type of immunity from patent unenforceability claims.
After a supplemental examination is completed, the Director of the United
States Patent and Trademark Office (“Director”), issues a certificate indicating
whether the information put forth during the supplemental examination “raises a
substantial new question of patentability.”128 If so, a reexamination is ordered.129
But, unlike traditional reexamination proceedings, those in a supplemental
examination process are not limited in review by looking to prior art consisting of
only patents and printed publications.130 If the reexamination does not raise a
substantial new question of patentability, or if the patent is still valid despite the
information disclosures, any information submitted is collaterally estopped from
Therasense Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
Id. at 1292.
123 But see 77 Fed. Reg. 3666, 3667 (Jan. 25, 2012) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. § 1) (“The Office
regards the term ‘material fraud’ in 35 U.S.C. § 257(e) to be narrower in scope than inequitable
conduct as defined by . . . Therasense . . . ).
124 AIA Report, supra note 19, at 28.
125 Id. at 31.
126 Id.
127 AIA, § 12 (to be codified 35 U.S.C. § 257(a)).
128 Id.
129 Id. See 35 U.S.C. § 305. Conduct of reexamination proceedings, in pertinent part:
In any reexamination proceeding under this chapter [35 USC §§ 301 et seq.], the
patent owner will be permitted to propose any amendment to his patent and a
new claim or claims thereto, in order to distinguish the invention as claimed from
the prior art . . . . No proposed amended or new claim enlarging the scope of a
claim of the patent will be permitted in a reexamination proceeding . . . .
Id.
130 AIA, § 12 (to be codified 35 U.S.C. § 257(b)) (“During the reexamination, the Director shall
address each substantial new question of patentability identified during the supplemental
examination, notwithstanding the limitations in chapter 30 [35 U.S.C. §§ 301, 303] relating to
patents and printed publications.”) (emphasis added).
121
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being used later, in civil litigation, to “hold the patent unenforceable or invalid on the
basis for an inequitable-conduct attack.”131 Specifically, “[a] patent shall not be held
unenforceable . . . if the information [although not considered before supplemental
examination] was considered, reconsidered, or corrected during a supplemental
examination . . . .”132 This is what has been called in effect a “patent amnesty
program.”133
There are exceptions to this estoppel provision, however.134 For example,
estoppel would not apply where an allegation, plead with particularity challenging
the patent in a civil litigation, was made prior to the supplemental examination
request; or in a defense in a patent enforcement action brought under section 281 or
under the Tariff Act of 1940, regarding information dealt with in the supplemental
examination, unless the supplemental examination and subsequent reexamination
concludes before the date the patent enforcement action was brought.135 But for both
exceptions, it is worth noting the patentee has great control over whether these
exceptions would apply.136
Because challenging patent liability, validity or
unenforceability are affirmative defenses and not causes of action, would be
infringers cannot challenge patents in federal court unless declaratory judgment
jurisdiction is triggered.137 The Declaratory Judgment Act138 does not provide an
independent basis for jurisdiction in federal court; it only provides a remedy.139 Only
the patentee’s actions can trigger declaratory judgment jurisdiction.140 To thwart
jurisdiction, a patentee can make a covenant not to sue the alleged infringer, and this
will eliminate any real and substantial conflict between the parties.141
To combat “material fraud”142 before the PTO, section 257(e) addresses means to
police fraud, beyond the remedies otherwise available through the reexamination
process (e.g. cancelling invalid patent claims).143 If during the supplemental
examination process, the Director becomes aware of facts amounting to “material
fraud” committed regarding the entire patenting process, the Director shall

AIA Report, supra note 19, at 31.
AIA, § 12 (to be codified 35 U.S.C. § 257(c)(1)).
133 Rantanen & Petherbridge, supra note 12 at 25.
134 AIA, § 12 (to be codified 35 U.S.C. § 257(c)(2)).
135 Id.
136 See Rantanen & Petherbridge, supra note 12, at 25.
137 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006) (listing noninfringement, invalidity and unenforceability as
affirmative defenses).
138 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2006)
139 Cat Tech L.L.C. v. TubeMaster, Inc., 528 F.3d 871, 879 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
140 MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 128 (2007) (requiring the dispute to be
definite and concrete between parties with real and substantial adverse legal interests in order to
trigger declaratory judgment jurisdiction).
141 See Amana Refrigeration, Inc. v. Quadlux, Inc., 172 F.3d 852, 855 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (finding
an actual case or controversy must be in existence at all times during the action, not merely on the
filing date).
142 But see 77 Fed. Reg. 3666, 3667 (Jan. 25, 2012) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. § 1) (“The Office
regards the term ‘material fraud’ in 35 U.S.C. 257(e) to be narrower in scope than inequitable
conduct as defined by . . . Therasense . . . ).
143 AIA, § 12 (to be codified 35 U.S.C. § 257(e)).
131
132
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confidentially “refer to the Attorney General” the matter,144 leaving it to the Attorney
General’s discretion to take further appropriate action.
In response, the Attorney General might pursue an action under 18 U.S.C.
section 1001(a)(1),145 making it a crime to falsify facts before federal agencies.146 This
crime, however, only has a five-year statute of limitations.147 It is measured from the
time the crime is complete, meaning when each element of the crime has occurred.148
For patent cases, this is likely to be measured from the date the false document is
submitted.149 Consequently, the statute of limitations will likely render the teeth to
this provision dull, because five years from the date of filing is too short of a time to
have much effect. For example, in fiscal year 2011 it took, on average, 33.7 months
for a patent application to issue as a patent.150 Similarly, the patent average total
pendency was 35.3 months in fiscal year 2010.151 If it takes, on average, almost three
years to get a patent, then it will generally take longer than five years for a patentee
to request supplemental examination. Any fraudulent information submitted, no
matter how egregious, could be corrected in a supplemental examination process
because the statute of limitations will have run out by the time the PTO is informed
as to the fraud. Unfortunately, the supplemental examination process could be used
as a way to cure even the most egregious misconduct before the PTO, giving the
patentee another bite at the apple despite engaging in bad behavior.
Congress, however, did leave open, some other avenues to punish deceptive
practices. Setting forth a “[r]ule of construction,” Congress specifically permits other
causes of action to address misconduct.152
For example, the supplemental
examination process is not meant to preclude imposing sanctions based on criminal,
144
145

Id.

Id.
18 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (2006) provides, in pertinent part:
Except as otherwise provide in this section, whoever, in any matter within the
jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of
the United States, knowingly and willfully—
(1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material
fact . . . shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 5 years . . .

146 Generally, those prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a) commit an underlying crime in
addition to the false statement before a federal agency. For example, when a person brings firearms
to the United States border trying to enter the country, that itself is a crime. Making a false
statement to the customs agent about having the weapons is an additional crime under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1001(a). In the patent prosecution context, having knowledge about a material prior art reference
is not an underlying crime, even if lying about that knowledge might be under 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a).
Without the underlying crime, it is unclear if the Attorney General will use discretion to take
further action.
147 18 U.S.C. § 3282. Offenses not capital, provides in pertinent part “[e]xcept as otherwise
expressly provided by law, no person shall be prosecuted, tried, or punished for any offense, not
capital, unless the indictment is found or the information is instituted within five years next after
such offense shall have been committed.” Id. at § 3282(a).
148 See United States v. Smith, 740 F.2d 734, 736 (9th Cir. 1984).
149 Id. (triggering the statute of limitations from the date of submission as opposed to the date
received); see United States v. Roshko, 969 F.2d 9, 12 (2d Cir. 1992).
150 Performance and Accountability Report FY 2011, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. (2011),
http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/ar/2011/USPTOFY2011PAR.pdf.
151 Id. at 14.
152 AIA, § 12 (to be codified 35 U.S.C. § 257(f)).
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antitrust or unfair trade practices,153 or limit the authority of the Director to
investigate misconduct and impose sanctions,154 or restrain the Director from issuing
regulations to sanction misconduct by those authorized to practice before the PTO.155
Although Congress has opened the door to punish egregious misconduct more
broadly, Congress did not mandate the PTO to investigate or sanction misconduct
under any specific circumstances. The question is, should misconduct, not quite
amounting to the fraud undertaken in the early Supreme Court cases, be policed? In
Therasense, the court specifically authorized policing “egregious misconduct”156
without requiring but-for causation of invalidity. Clearly included in “egregious
misconduct” is the behavior in the traditional unclean hands cases that led to the
development of the inequitable conduct doctrine. But, in Therasense, the court also
mentioned filing unmistakably false affidavits amounted to material misconduct.157
It is clear from the proposed regulations governing supplemental examination, the
PTO regards the term “material fraud” in section 257(e) to be narrower in scope than
the inequitable conduct the Federal Circuit defined in Therasense.158 The one
deterrent for requesting supplemental examination and follow-on ex parte
reexamination may be the fee. The proposed fee for filing a request for supplemental
examination is $5180.159 If ex parte reexamination is ordered, the fee is an additional
$16,120.160 This compares to the cost of ex parte reexamination, before the proposed
changes, of $2520.161 If enacted, these fees will increase the cost by tenfold.162 But,
in exchange, a patentee can maintain the enforceability of its patent.163
Further, the AIA, in order to weaken the reach of inequitable conduct defense,
has removed the deceptive intent language in several of the sections of Title 35:
116(c),164 251(a),165 and 256.166 The Savings Clause found in section 115(h)(3) makes

Id. (to be codified 35 U.S.C. § 257(f)(1)).
Id. (to be codified 35 U.S.C. § 257(f)(2)).
155 Id. (to be codified 35 U.S.C. § 257(f)(2)).
156 Therasense Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
157 Id.
158 77 Fed. Reg. 3666, 3667 (Jan. 25, 2012) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. § 1). [hereinafter
Supplemental Examination Provisions].
159 Id. at 3668.
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Gregory VNovak, Concurrent Reexaminations as a Strategic Patent Litigation Defense Tool,
in PATENT LITIGATION 2009, at 661, 663 (PLI Pats., Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Prop.,
Course Handbook Ser. No. 982, 2009), available at WL, 982 PLI/Pat 661.
164 35 U.S.C. § 116(c) (2006). Correction of Errors in Application says: “Whenever through
error a person is named in an application for patent as the inventor, of through error an inventor is
not names in an application, the Director may permit the application to be amended
accordingly . . . ” Id. Removing the language “and such error arose without any deceptive intention
of his part.” Id.
165 35 U.S.C. § 251. Reissue of defective patents (a) removed “without any deceptive intention”
language and allows patents to be reissued “[w]henever any patent is, through error, deemed wholly
or partially inoperative or invalid . . . by reason of patentee claiming more or less than he had a
right to claim . . . .” Id.
153
154
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it so patents cannot be held invalid or unenforceable for failure to comply with
naming an inventor, provided such error is remedied.167 The intent to withhold an
inventor is no longer policed specifically. All fraud appears to be policed through 18
U.S.C. section 1001, with its five-year statute of limitations.168
It may be necessary for members of the patent bar to have an open dialogue
about the practices that should be penalized even when the misconduct would not
have prevented a patent from issuing. As was mentioned in Part II, these types of
discussions were lacking even back when the AIPLA wrote its white paper in 1988,
because the focus centered on how draconian the application of the doctrine had
been.169 Now is the time to have this conversation to encourage thoughtful PTO
regulations to police any significant misconduct not specifically addressed either in
Therasense or in the AIA. Possibilities include defining “material fraud” more
broadly than what is currently stated in the proposed rules.170 Also, there may be an
opportunity to have discussions with the PTO on the requirement under section 26
that the PTO report to Congress on the implementation of the AIA. Perhaps, over
time, the concerns expressed above will take hold and there can be another
opportunity for Congress to address some of these shortcomings.
IV. CASES USING THE NEW INEQUITABLE CONDUCT STANDARD UNDER THERASENSE
A. Powell v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc.: A Federal Circuit Case Since Therasense
In Powell v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc.,171 the patentee, Powell, sued Home Depot
for infringing his patent on radial arm guard safety technology.172 For customer
convenience, Home Depot has radial arm saws to cut lumber on site at its stores.173
Because employees were getting injured using these saws, Home Depot either had to
remove them or make them safer.174 Powell installed and repaired radial arm saws
for Home Depot.175 He invented a safety guard mechanism, patented it, and was
supposed to be the contractor to install them. During patent prosecution, Powell
submitted a petition to make special176 because he thought he was going to be
“obligated to manufacture and supply devices embodying the claims sought.”177
166 35 U.S.C. § 256. Correction of named inventor, where correct could be made provided the
error arose without deceptive intent. Removes “and such error arose without any deceptive intent
on his part,” so that all errors can be changed at any time.
167 35 U.S.C. § 115(h)(3).
168 18 U.S.C. §§ 1001, 3282 (2006).
169 AIPLA Committee Paper, supra note 29, at 74–75.
170 Contra Supplemental Examination Provisions, supra note 158, at 3667.
171 Powell v. The Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 663 F.3d 1221 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
172 Id. at 1226–27.
173 Id. at 1227.
174 Id.
175 Id.
176 See 37 C.F.R. § 1.102.
Generally patent applications are examined in turn. Id. An
applicant may petition to make an application special so that it is advanced out of turn. Id.
177 Powell, 663 F.3d at 1235.
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Before the Petition to Make Special was granted, however, Home Depot
contracted with Powell’s competitor to install the safety devices.178 Powell’s petition
was granted after he knew he was no longer obligated to build and supply devices
embodying the claims, but failed to update the petition stating so.179 After the patent
issued, Powell sued Home Depot for patent infringement.180 Home Depot alleged
Powell committed inequitable conduct when he failed to update his petition.181
The trial court found Powell, with intent to deceive, failed to disclose to the PTO
he no longer had an obligation to manufacture.182 Such an omission was found
material, but the court, after balancing the equities, determined Home Depot failed
to prove inequitable conduct by clear and convincing evidence.183 On appeal, the
Federal Circuit affirms the trial court applying the new standards in Therasense.184
The court held a failure to “update the record to inform the PTO that the
circumstances which support a Petition to Make Special no longer exist—[] does not
constitute inequitable conduct.”185 The court reached this conclusion because
Powell’s conduct did not meet the but-for materiality standard and was not “the type
of unequivocal act, ‘such as the filing of an unmistakably false affidavit,’ that would
rise to the level of ‘affirmative egregious misconduct.’”186
Here, it is possible Powell intended to deceive the PTO, but it is equally
plausible that he merely forgot or was negligent in failing to update. Thus, the facts
may not support a finding of affirmative egregious misconduct to invoke an exception
to the Therasense but-for materiality standard. But, closing the door on any false
statements made in a petition to make special from meeting the but-for materiality
standard seems extreme and could open the door for abuse. Without some flexibility
in interpreting materiality regarding failure to update petitions at the PTO, the court
may be opening Pandora’s Box. It may be difficult to prove affirmative egregious
misconduct, but allowing applicants who submit false petitions to go unpunished is
likely imprudent. For example, after reading this case, applicants might think it is
acceptable to intentionally fail to update pertinent facts when submitting petitions to
make special or petitions for small or micro entity status, because such a
misrepresentation “does not constitute inequitable conduct.”187
Instead of
categorically finding a failure to update does not constitute the type of behavior
amounting to inequitable conduct, the focus should really be on whether the failure
to update was intentional or not. In Powell, the trial court did find an intent to
deceive.188
An alternative to the Federal Circuit’s ruling might be to interpret the but-for
materiality standard differently. In the past, false statements in a petition to make
Id.
Id.
180 Id. at 1228.
181 Id. at 1234.
182 Id. at 1235.
183 Id.
184 Id.
185 Id.
186 Id.
187 Id.
188 Id.
178
179
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special were considered material when the petition would not have been granted,
but-for the misstatement.189 In this situation, the court evaluates whether the
statement made was false. If it is not, then materiality is lacking. If it is false, then
the court should determine whether the petition would have been granted without
the false statement.
In Therasense the court discusses the but-for materiality standard as it applies
to prior art: “[w]hen an applicant fails to disclose prior art to the PTO, that prior art
is but-for material if the PTO would not have allowed a claim had it been aware of
the undisclosed art.”190 The court does not discuss what the disclosure standards are
for evaluating petitions. The court states, however, affirmative acts of egregious
misconduct are material irrespective of whether or not they meet the but-for
materiality standard. Such an example, the court offers, is an unmistakably false
affidavit.191 But, the court does not necessarily preclude applying the but-for
materiality standard for petitions the way it had in the past—whether but-for the
false statement the PTO would have granted the petition. If this modified but-for
materiality standard is used, to prevent abuse, it is important the intent to deceive
prong is also met.
In Powell, it is disturbing that Home Depot, by infringing and contracting with
someone else, actually caused Powell’s statement to be false. If Home Depot had not
breached the contract with Powell, his statement would have been true. This is
something that should have been part of the discussion in the case, and it was not.
The focus on materiality has swallowed up the intent discussion, just like it did
before Therasense.192
Clearly, the proposed regulations for supplemental examination would not
include this type of conduct as a “material fraud,” as it is defined more narrowly than
that in Therasense.193
B. District Court Cases Since Therasense
1. Metris U.S.A. Inc., v. Faro Techs., Inc.194
The two patents comprising the inventions use scanning technology to create
accurate three-dimensional digital models of physical objects.195 Patentee sued
189 Scanner Techs. Corp. v. ICOS Vision Sys. Corp. N.V., 528 F.3d 1365, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(holding “a false statement that succeeds in expediting the application is, as a matter of law,
material for purposes of assessing the issue of inequitable conduct”). Gen. Electro Music Corp. v.
Samick Music Corp., 19 F.3d 1405 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (holding “as a matter of law that a false
statement in a petition to make special is material if . . . it succeeds in prompting expedited
consideration”).
190 Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1291.
191 Id. at 1292.
192 Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 872 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
193 See Supplemental Examination Provisions, supra note 158, at 3667.
194 Metris U.S.A., Inc., v. Faro Techs., Inc., No. 08-CV-11187, 2011 WL 434682 (D. Mass. Sept.
19, 2011).
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competitor for patent infringement. After a bench trial, but before Therasense was
issued, the court found the patents unenforceable due to inequitable conduct.
Subsequently, the trial court ordered further briefing to address the consequences of
the Therasense decision. After applying the new standards, the trial court found the
inequitable conduct challenges could no longer be proven by clear and convincing
evidence. The previous decision was vacated.196
Originally, the court found the named inventor, Crampton, intended to deceive
the patent office by withholding information about the collaboration between the
patentee, and the defendant.197 In developing the patented invention, Crampton
worked together, in depth, with the defendant, Faro Technologies, Inc. (“Faro”), to
perfect synch and trigger scanning technology to operate using articulated arms to
improve three-dimensional scanning accuracy. Additionally, Crampton denied Faro
played any role in interfacing its arm with patentee’s scanner technology.198
Crampton also described an “excessively narrow understanding of prior art,”199
despite having previously drafted patent applications.200 The trial court found
inventor intended to deceive the PTO because he withheld information that he
collaborated with and used Faro’s articulated arms together with patentee’s
scanners.201 As a consequence, the court cast doubt on the accuracy of patentee’s
claims of sole inventorship and found the relationship with Faro should have been
disclosed.202
But, after Therasense, the court was required to apply the but-for materiality
standard. The court said defendant did not establish “that the undisclosed
information would have altered the patent examiner’s finding of inventorship.”203
The question of joint inventorship may be a more likely conclusion, but, under the
but-for materiality standard in Therasense, “Faro has not met its burden of proving
that the patent would not have been issued to Crampton alone if information about
Faro’s collaboration had been disclosed.”204
Further, Faro was unsuccessful in convincing the court Crampton’s lying
amounted to affirmative egregious misconduct, an exception to the but-for
Id. at *1.
Id.
197 Metris U.S.A. v. Faro Techs., Inc., 768 F. Supp. 2d 338 (D. Mass. 2011).
198 Id. at 352.
199 Id.
200 Id. at 349 (Faro drafted both the British and the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT)
application because he could not afford to hiring an attorney).
201 Metris, 2011 WL 434682, at *2.
202 Metris, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 357.
[W]here a putative joint inventor has not played a role in the conception of the
entire invention, he or she can still be a joint inventor as long as he or she ‘(1)
contribute[s] in some significant manner to the conception or reduction to practice
of the invention[;] (2) makes[s] a contribution to the claimed invention that is not
insignificant in quality, when that contribution is measured against the
dimension of the full invention[;] and (3) do[es] more than merely explain to the
real inventors well-known concepts and/or the current state of the art.’
Id.
203 Metris, 2011 WL 434682, at *3.
204 Id.
195
196
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materiality standard.205 Although the court found Crampton’s sworn testimony in
litigation was “purposefully evasive,”206 since it did not occur during patent
prosecution, it did not constitute affirmative egregious misconduct as described by
the Federal Circuit in Therasense, where the “focus of the inequitable conduct inquiry
is the inventor’s conduct before the patent examiner.”207 In any case, the court noted
the concern in Therasense that inequitable conduct “only be applied in instances
where the patentee’s misconduct resulted in the unfair benefit of receiving an
unwarranted claim.”208 Thus, it would be inappropriate to find inequitable conduct
here.
In addition to the changes made by Therasense, the AIA amends the provisions
regarding inventorship and correction of inventorship.209 Under the old rule, a
patent applicant was not allowed to correct inventorship to add a named inventor
who was intentionally left off when filing a patent application.210 If an inventor were
omitted, with deceptive intent, the error could not be cured and the patent was
void.211 Under the AIA, the language “without any deceptive intent” has been
removed.212 Now, any error in identifying inventors may not be the basis of
invalidating a patent213 or make the patent unenforceable.214

Id. at *4.
Id.
207 Id. (stating the affirmative egregious exception is available because it is unlikely a patentee
would go to such lengths unless it believes the deceit will affect patent issuance).
208 Id.
209 35 U.S.C. §§ 115, 256 (2006).
210 35 U.S.C. § 256.
Whenever through error a person is named in an issued patent as the inventor, or
through error an inventor is not named in an issued patent and such error arose
without any deceptive intention on his part, the Director may, on application of all
the parties and assignees, with proof of the facts and such other requirements as
may be imposed, issue a certificate correcting such error.
Id. (emphasis added).
211 See, e.g., Kennedy v. Hazelton, 128 U.S. 667, 672 (1888) (“The patent law makes it essential
to the validity of a patent that it shall be granted on the application . . . of the original and first
inventor . . . ”).
212 AIA, supra note 2, § 20(f)(1–2) (to be codified 35 U.S.C. § 256).
Correction. Whenever error a person is named in an issued patent as the
inventor, or through error an inventor is not named in an issued patent, the
Director may, on application of all the parties and assignees, with proof of the
facts and such other requirements as may be imposed, issue a certificate
correcting such error.
Id. (note removal of “without deceptive intention” language).
213 Id. at § 20(f)(1)–(2) (to be codified 35 U.S.C. § 256).
(b) Patent valid if error corrected. The error of omitting inventors or naming
persons who are not inventors shall not invalidate the patent in which such error
occurred if it can be corrected as provided in this section . The court before which
such matter is called in question may order correction of the patent on notice and
hearing of all parties concerned and the Director shall issue a certificate
accordingly.
Id. (emphasis added).
214 Id. at § 4(a)(1) (to be codified 35 U.S.C. § 115 (h)(3).
205
206
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The AIA amendments regarding inventorship were made primarily to recognize
the realities of patent practice “[where] it has become increasingly common for patent
applications to be assigned to corporate entities, most commonly the employer of the
invention.”215 The purpose for changing the statute was to correct the antiquated
way in which the law had catered to the idea that inventors were primarily the ones
filing patent applications, and not the company-assignee.216 Although modernizing
the law to meet current patent practice has merit, the change may have had some
unintentional effects. Namely, correcting inventorship is no longer grounds for
making a patent invalid or unenforceable, even if it were intentionally
misrepresented.217 The punishment no longer follows the patent where attacking the
property right made it unenforceable or invalid. Instead, when filing an inventor’s
oath or declaration, the statement must contain a clause stating that a “willful false
statement” regarding inventorship is punishable under 18 U.S.C. section 1001218 by
fine, not more than five years imprisonment, or both.219 The question is whether any
deceptive behavior regarding inventorship should be policed besides that amounting
to proving fraud under 18 U.S.C. section 1001, with its five-year statute of
limitations.
Because the AIA was enacted after the patent application in Metris was filed,
the new provisions would not apply.220 Nonetheless, Metris foreshadows future

Id.

(3) Savings Clause: A patent shall not be invalid or unenforceable based upon
the failure to comply with a requirement under this section if the failure is
remedied.

215 AIA Report, supra note 19, at 43 (discussing increasingly high percentages of patent
applications being filed by corporate assignees); Jerry C. Liu, Overview of Patent Ownership
Considerations in Joint Technology Development, 2005 SYRACUSE SCI. & TECH. L. REP. 1 (2005).
216 See generally AIA Report, supra note 19.
217 See 35 U.S.C. § 256; see AIA, supra note 2, § 4(a)(1) (to be codified, 35 U.S.C. § 115 (2012)).
218 18 U.S.C. § 1001.
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, whoever, in any matter within
the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government
of the United States, knowingly and willfully—
(1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material
fact;
(2) makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or
representation; or
(3) makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to
contain any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry;
shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 5 years.
Id.
219 35 U.S.C. § 115(i).
(i) Acknowledgement of Penalties. Any declaration or statement filed
pursuant to this section shall contain an acknowledgement that any
willful false statement made in such declaration or statement is
punishable under section 1001 of the title 18 by fine or imprisonment of
not more than 5 years, or both.
Id.
220 See AIA, supra note 2, § 3(n)(1) (giving the date and subject matter as to when the act
becomes effective as 18 months from the date of enactment (September 16, 2011)); Metris U.S.A.,
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problems that might arise when both the standards in Therasense and the AIA are
applied to a similar fact pattern.
A solution to this situation may be to characterize lying about inventorship as
affirmatively egregious so that the behavior becomes an exception to the but-for
materiality test for Therasense. A drawback is that sometimes the egregious
behavior occurs in litigation and not just before PTO. Perhaps, this misconduct
should be policed as well.221
2. Jersey Asparagus Farms, Inc. v. Rutgers Univ.
In Jersey Asparagus Farms, Inc. v. Rutgers Univ.,222 the licensee, Jersey
Asparagus Farms, Inc. (“JAFI”), sued Rutgers University (“Rutgers”) for, inter alia,
antitrust monopolization and sought a declaratory judgment that the pertinent
patents on asparagus varieties were obtained fraudulently. Specifically, JAFI called
into question the legitimacy of the exclusive license agreements and the royalties
Rutgers desired. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss. The court dismissed plaintiff’s
claim for failing to allege the requisite scienter for antitrust monopolization under a
Walker Process223 theory.224
JAFI, exclusive licensee for over twenty years, terminated the license agreement
between the parties sometime after realizing the underlying patents were either
invalid or had expired. The license had granted JAFI authorization to cross-breed
defendant’s patented asparagus, harvest all-male hybrid seed from those plants, and
sell such with a license prohibiting both JAFI and farmers from propagating new
hybrids through asexual reproduction.225 After JAFI discovered some of the patents
had expired, it stopped paying Rutgers.226 Then, Rutgers demanded the plants be
returned.227
JAFI contends almost all of defendants’ patents on asparagus are fraudulently
obtained because the inventors, all of whom work for Rutgers University, falsely
swore in signed affidavits they had no knowledge the subject asparagus varieties had
been previously described in any printed publication or in public use or on sale in the
United States more than one year before filing the application.228 JAFI sets forth
Inc, v. Faro Rechs, Inc., No. 08-CV-11187, 2011 WL 434682 (D. Mass. Sept. 19, 2011) (stating the
patent was granted in 1997).
221 A remedy for this behavior may be to seek to find the case exceptional under 35 U.S.C. 285,
leading to the possibility of an award of attorney fees. See MarcTec, L.L.C. v. Johnson & Johnson,
664 F.3d 907, 916 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Aptix Corp. v. Ouickturn Design Sys., Inc., 269 F.3d 1369, 1379
(Fed. Cir. 2001) (Mayer, C.J., dissenting); Therasense, Inc. v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d
1276, 1296 (O’Malley, J., concurring).
222 803 F. Supp. 2d 295 (D.N.J. 2011).
223 Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach., 382 U.S. 172, 179 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(holding fraud on the patent office may violate the Sherman Act if all other elements to prove
antitrust are present, including treble damages under the Clayton Act).
224 Jersey Asparagus Farms, 803 F. Supp. 2d at 312.
225 Id. at 298.
226 Id.
227 Id. at 302.
228 Id. at 298–99; See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006). A person is entitled to a patent unless:
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specific examples of sales and/or public uses of patented varieties that took place
before the critical date.229 The misrepresentations are material because but-for these
statements, the patents would not have issued, as the technology would have been
dedicated to the public.230 But, the court finds plaintiff was unable to satisfy the
intent prong because it failed to allege defendant “intentionally omitted reference to
these uses/sales in order to defraud the PTO.”231
The court agreed with defendants, that the patents themselves indicate prior
uses were disclosed to the PTO.232 The court identifies some of those references, but
fails to acknowledge that those disclosures appear to be related to experimental uses
of the claimed inventions, which would not preclude patentability.233 Because this
action was a motion to dismiss, the court was required to accept the plaintiff’s
allegations as true and did not need to evaluate whether the use was experimental.234
It should, however, be suspicious that the uses disclosed appeared, on their face, to
be experimental while all the other alleged uses, which were not disclosed, would
have invalidated the patent claims.
It is more plausible to thwart a charge of intent to deceive where Rutgers
submits its license agreements during patent prosecution indicating it is engaged in
experimental research with the patented invention.
The court focuses on the language attacking a finding of inequitable conduct as
an atomic bomb remedy:
Because inequitable conduct renders an entire patent (or even a patent
family unenforceable, as a general rule, this doctrine should only be applied
in instances where the patentee’s misconduct resulted in the unfair benefit
of receiving an unwarranted claim.235
But, here, if those public uses and sales took place before the critical date, the
only claim for each patent would be invalidated.
The court said to prove antitrust, negligent misrepresentations are not
enough.236 “[A] plaintiff must not only allege that the inventor knew of the prior sale
but also that he knew the relevance of that prior sale.”237 But this analysis may be
somewhat flawed because the charge of antitrust can be sustained where patentee
knows the patents are ill-gotten and is enforcing them anyway.238 If there is a sale or
the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or a
foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year
prior to the date of the application for patent in the United States . . . .
229 Jersey Asparagus Farms, 803 F. Supp. 2d at 299 (stating that the critical date is defined as
one year before the date of filing a patent application in the United States).
230 Id.
231 Id. at 310.
232 Id. at 307.
233 Id.
234 Id.
235 Id. at 312.
236 Id. at 310.
237 Id. at 311.
238 See e.g. Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach., 382 U.S. 172 (1965); Nobelpharma AB v.
Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Katherine E. White, A Rule For
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a public use more than one year before the patent application is filed, then the
patents would be invalid under section 102. Patentee did not disclose it. Under the
old rule “reasonable examiner” standard, certainly these misrepresentations would
be highly material and under the sliding scale they would be sufficient to show intent
to deceive. Is it the intent of Therasense to not prohibit this behavior? The but-for
causation is strong. It may be too easy now, under Therasense, to lie now and ask for
forgiveness later. This is putting pressure on the integrity of the ex parte patenting
process.
3. Apotex Inc. v. Cephalon
In Apotex Inc. v. Cephalon,239 the dispute in this case surrounds the validity and
enforceability of Cephalon’s patented drug for sleep disorders, Provigil®, otherwise
known as modafinil. Apotex sought approval to sell its generic version of Provigil® in
an abbreviated new drug application (“ANDA”) for U.S. Food and Drug
Administration (“FDA”) approval. Because defendant’s drug was still patented at the
time of Apotex’s application, a technical infringement, Apotex filed a declaratory
judgment that defendant’s patent was, inter alia, unenforceable.240
Plaintiff’s primary argument is defendant derived the patented invention from
Lafon, a French company.241 Defendant does not dispute it received the drug from
LaFon. Instead defendant argues the “invention” is appreciating that a smaller
particle size of the drug improves bioavailability and dissolution, characteristics
Lafon never appreciated.242 At trial, the court found Lafon “conducted numerous
tests with batches of [active pharmaceutical ingredients] that fell within the claim
limits,” and found these were effective in treating narcolepsy.243
To meet the conception requirements for invention, an inventor, to conceive a
pharmaceutical compound must “know of its specific chemical structure, ha[ve] a
method for making it, and appreciate[] that it has a utility.”244 Thus, here, Lafon was
aware of the compounds specific structure, had a method for manufacturing it, and
appreciated the compound’s utility in treating narcolepsy. Thus, Lafon is a true
inventor.245 The court emphasized “patent law imposes certain fundamental
conditions for patentability, paramount among them being the condition that what is

Determing When Patent Misuse Should be Applied, 11 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
671 (2001).
239 Apotex Inc. v. Cephalon, No. 06-cv-2768, 2011 WL 6090696 (E.D. Pa, Nov. 7, 2011).
240 Id. at *3.
241 Id. at *1.
242 Id. at *2. It should be noted that Cephalon purchased Lafon on December 28, 2001. Id.
Lafon had discovered modafinial in 1976, but had not included any references to particle size. Id.
Cephalon patented the RE’516, entitled “[[Acetamide]] Derivative Having Defined Particle Size.” Id.
But, Cephalon had received the drug from Lafon, in particle sizes falling within the RE’516 claims
from 1989–93. Id.
243 Id. at *18.
244 Id.
245 Id. at *19.
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sought to be patented . . . be new.”246 Here, Cephalon’s argument fails to take into
account that the drug it claims to have invented was previously tested,
manufactured, and used by Lafon for the treatment of narcolepsy. Cephalon did not
even make a new form of the drug, it “in fact, did nothing to it at all.”247 Cephalon
received, from Lafon, the claimed invention in the exact chemical properties as that
which defendant patented.248 Consequently, the court found clear and convincing
evidence Lafon communicated the invention to Cephalon prior to the application
filing date, and thus derived the invention.249
In applying Therasense, the court looked at both materiality and intent. The
court found Cephalon failed to disclose Lafon’s prior art manufacturing and testing
batches of the patented drug, modafinil, with characteristics, including particle size,
that fell within the claim limitations. Cephalon also failed to disclose the agreement
in which Lafon agreed to supply Cephalon the drug. Cephalon also failed to disclose
Lafon’s test results and data concerning the small particle modafinil, which also
demonstrated derivation. “Had the PTO been aware [of Lafon’s substantial role in
Cephalon’s claimed invention], it would not have allowed the patent to issue.”250
Thus, the materiality prong was met.
As for the intent prong, there was no smoking gun showing specific intent to
deceive. But, the court found the clear and convincing standard of intent to deceive
was met because it was the “the single most reasonable inference.”251 The complete
concealment of Lafon’s involvement in the development of the claimed invention
“establishes Cephalon’s deception by clear and convincing evidence.”252 To further
add to its deception, Cephalon mislead the PTO and stated it had modified the
particle size, which had not been changed from the product Lafon had supplied.253 In
this case, the new standards for inequitable conduct under Therasense are sufficient
to appropriately address Cephalon’s misconduct.
4. Light Guard Sys., Inc. v. Spot Devices, Inc.
In Light Guard Sys., Inc. v. Spot Devices, Inc.,254 the plaintiff is assignee of a
patent on a pedestrian crosswalk signal apparatus. Plaintiff alleges defendant is
infringing and moves for a preliminary injunction to stop further sales of the
allegedly infringing systems.
Defendant argues the patent is invalid and

Id.
Id. at *20.
248 Id.
249 Id. (“A party alleging invalidity for derivation must also prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the invention conceived was communicated to the patentee prior to the date of the
application.”).
250 Id. at *26.
251 Id. at *27.
252 Id.
253 Id.
254 Light Guard Sys., Inc. v. Spot Devices, Inc., No. 3:10-CV-0737, 2011 WL 3022530 (D. Nev.,
July 22, 2011).
246
247
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unenforceable due to inequitable conduct because plaintiff failed to disclose a known
material prior art reference, Kanasashi, during patent prosecution.255
Under Therasense, the court evaluates whether patentee had specific intent to
deceive in failing to disclose a known material reference. It is undisputed that
plaintiff knew of the Kanasashi reference, the difference of opinion surrounds
whether it was a material reference and whether there was intent to deceive.256
As for materiality, the court, after evaluating the expert testimony, finds the
Kanasashi reference is but-for material because the PTO would not have allowed a
claim had it been aware of it.257 The court also emphasized a letter from plaintiff’s
patent attorney identifying Kanasashi, and patentee’s brother who helped design the
invention remarked Kanasashi was as a “major problem’ as ‘the drawings show what
appears to be exactly what we are trying to patent.”258 Despite the strong materiality
of the reference, however, the court did not infer intent to deceive because it was
plausible applicant thought the reference was cumulative.259 The defendant argued
the single most reasonable inference Kanasashi was not submitted to the PTO was to
deceive the patent examiner. The plaintiff argued it was equally plausible that there
was no intent to deceive because the Kanasashi was in a foreign language and the
translation received expressed a different structure from the claimed design. Thus, it
was plausible the applicant believed the reference was cumulative of the art already
submitted.260
This case exposes the idea that a patentee can always claim it did not submit a
reference because it was cumulative. But, whenever the reference meets the but-for
materiality standard, arguing that applicant thought it was cumulative should be
suspect. If the PTO would not have granted the patent if it had known about the
reference, that flies in the face of the argument that the reference was cumulative as
to what was already submitted. An applicant can always deny its intent to deceive.
This concern is probably what gave rise to the now defunct sliding scale standard,
where materiality was valued in terms of how it inferred an intent to deceive. It is
just hard to believe there was no intent to deceive where a reference is but-for
material and it is the only reference that was not disclosed when all other disclosed
references would not have affected patentability. When it is proven the applicant
knew of the reference, the intent threshold should not be so low as to just be able to
escape liability by stating, “I thought it was cumulative.” If this happens, the
pendulum has just swung the other way and inventors will be free to mislead and lie
to the PTO. Over time, this will harm the integrity of the system.

Id. at *4.
Id. at *6 (mentioning a letter identifying Kanasashi as possible pertinent prior art).
257 Id.
258 Id.
259 Id. at *7.
260 Id.
255
256
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V. CONCLUSION
With Therasense tightening the standards to prove inequitable conduct and the
AIA limiting the enforcement remedies for misconduct before the PTO, the doctrine’s
effectiveness has essentially been eliminated. Furthermore, with the AIA removing
of all remnants of the phrase “intent to deceive” from the patent statute, it may be
encouraging an intent to deceive or at the very least sending a signal that deception
is no longer placed at a premium to enforce against.261 Because inequitable conduct
has historically policed the integrity of the patent system, such drastic changes to the
doctrine’s effectiveness may inevitably encourage deception before the PTO, or at a
minimum, fail to discourage deception.262 Patent applicants who fail to disclose butfor material information before the PTO can completely correct their behavior
through the new supplemental examination process and ask the PTO to consider,
reconsider, or correct information not originally examined.263 Even though material
fraud committed before the PTO may be referred to the Attorney General to pursue
under 18 U.S.C. section 1001(a)(1), this statute has a five-year statute of limitations
and thus may not be an effective policing mechanism.264 Even though excessive
charging of inequitable conduct in almost every case had become a plague on the
patent system, this extensive attack on the doctrine may have swung the pendulum
too far in the other direction.265 Congress did leave open opportunities in the AIA
section 12, the rule of construction, to further police misconduct.266 It is important to
finally have discussions about what is required to preserve the integrity of the
patenting process now that one of the levers to maintain that process has been
weakened.

See supra Part III.
See supra Part IV.
263 See supra Part III.
264 See supra Part IV.
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